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The paper aims to provoke thought on the apparent entrapment of the poorest countries in a
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between human and natural resources, the other to failure to diversify exports.  These
hypotheses are subjected to a series of statistical tests, which draw attention to various
anomalies, questions and issues that require further investigation.
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Introduction
The limited economic progress of the great majority of low-income countries over the past few
decades is deeply troubling.  The most conspicuous recent manifestation of this problem has
been the lack of success of structural adjustment programmes in Africa.  Looking further back,
it is clear that most of the countries that were extremely poor forty or fifty years ago are still
extremely poor today, and seem likely to remain so for the indefinite future.  In short, the
poorest countries appear to be trapped in a vicious circle of self-perpetuating backwardness,
which conventional aid and policy advice strategies have not been able to break.
This Working Paper looks again at this large issue - with the aim of generating fresh ideas for
more substantial subsequent research, which may in turn yield clues for future policies and
assistance strategies.  It reviews some of the facts about low-income countries, and explores
various hypotheses about the causes of their persistent poverty.  The words `various' and
`hypotheses' should be emphasised, since this paper does not try to arrive at any simple
diagnosis, let alone cure.  Its objective, rather, is to provoke thought.
Needless to say, many others - in universities, in governments, and in international
organisations - are studying this or closely related issues.  This paper draws on their ideas and
findings, but does not attempt to provide a full review, nor to map out all the differences of
opinion that emerge.  However, it is worth making a simplified contrast between the approach
of this paper, and what has become the standard approach of most official development
agencies, epitomised by the World Bank.  The official approach may be summarised as
domestic-policy-oriented, short-to-medium term, and concerned with individual countries.  The
approach of this paper, by contrast, is internationally oriented, long-term, and concerned with
the experience of country groups.
The paper is organised into four main sections.  The first is a selective review of the state of
the debate on growth failure, covering conventional arguments, structuralist arguments, and
new growth theory, with some preliminary statistical analysis.  The next two sections, which
between them constitute the bulk of the paper, discuss two alternative (but not mutually
exclusive) hypotheses about the persistence of national poverty: imbalance between human and
natural resources; and failure to diversify exports.  Each of these hypotheses is elaborated and
statistically tested.  The fourth and final section draws together some of the threads from earlier
sections into a pattern for future research.
2The State of the Debate on Growth Failure
There is no shortage of ideas about the determinants of growth or the reasons why growth fails
to occur.  But the distressingly low success rate for the remedies so far applied to the poorest
countries' problems suggests that existing formulations are not wholly satisfactory, and that
there may be room for additional contributions.  This section reviews some of the current ideas
in circulation under three headings: the conventional wisdom of Western governments and
international financial institutions; the structuralist critique; and the concepts of new growth
theory.
Conventional views on growth failure
The `Washington Consensus', in its application to the poorest countries [see Williamson, 1991],
suggests that growth failure stems from inappropriate policies in up to eleven key areas.  These
are:
• Fiscal indiscipline, defined as an operating budget deficit of more than 2% of GDP.
• Wrong public expenditure priorities, which neglect areas with high economic and
social returns, such as primary health and education, and infrastructure.
• Inadequate tax reform to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates.
• Lack of financial liberalisation, to achieve an undistorted structure of interest rates
and a positive average real interest rate.
• Failure to maintain a realistic and unified exchange rate, which hinders growth of
non-traditional exports and general export competitiveness.
• Failure to liberalise trade , where the target (over 3-10 years) should be a uniform
tariff of 10-20%.
• Failure to encourage foreign direct investment.
• Lack of privatisation of state and parastatal enterprises.
• Absence of deregulation (except where justified by criteria such as safety,
environmental protection or prudential supervision of financial institutions).
• Poorly specified property rights, which should be secured by the legal system
without excessive cost (and be available to the informal sector).
• For the poorest countries, the Washington Consensus also emphasises the failure
by the international community to provide sufficient aid - though it does not specify
how large concessional transfers should be (either in absolute terms or as a share of
GDP in donor or recipient countries).
It is perfectly possible to agree with much of the Washington Consensus's broad diagnosis of
3the causes of failure without also accepting its proposed remedies for inadequate growth
performance in the poorest countries, which are strongly market orientated.  For example, even
where growth has been hindered by failure to engage in tax reform, financial illiberalism,
inappropriate exchange rates and trade illiberalism, it does not necessarily follow that
appropriate finance and trade policies should all be non-discriminatory.  Another example of
shared diagnosis leading to differing prescriptions is provided by our hypothesis about failure
to diversify exports.  In one sense this is a part of the Washington Consensus.  But it is treated
in the Consensus purely in terms of failure to develop appropriate price incentives.  By
contrast, we would also emphasise the neglect of relevant non-market institutions, and also the
scope for reform to state enterprises to make the management of large export projects more
efficient. 
Structuralist views on growth failure1
The structuralist view of the failure of growth performance in the poorest countries stands in
contrast to that of the Washington Consensus.  It can be summarised under four headings:
Reliance on primary products
Typically, the poorest developing countries rely heavily on primary commodity exports.  It is
argued that these products are particularly subject to adverse terms of trade, revenue instability
(due to export volume and world market price fluctuations), protectionist obstacles in
developed countries, and slow technical progress.  These problems can only be resolved by
developing the manufacturing sector and confining reliance on foreign firms to technical
transfer and the supply of market information.
Failure of trade policy
In the area of trade policy, and in sharp opposition to the Washington Consensus, structuralist
writers emphasise:
• failure to develop domestic manufacturing through import substitution policies
based on the infant industry argument;
• neglect of selective industrial policy to promote manufactured exports (with
upstream import substitution);
• absence of optimal export taxes for relevant commodities and of appropriate co-
operation among supplying countries;
• insufficient exploitation of the scope for trade policy based on special and
differential treatment giving non-reciprocal access to developed-country markets;
• inadequate use of quantitative import controls (QRs) to regulate the balance of
payments, and as an instrument of industrial and export promotion policy.
                                                                                                                                                       
1 We are grateful to Hans Singer for assistance in preparing this statement of structuralist views.
4Inadequate transfers
The structuralists point to failure to provide sufficient emergency aid, including food aid, for
natural and man-made disasters, failure to link these transfers to development, and failure to
make large rehabilitation transfers (which, in the case of Japan and Germany, were very
productive).  Long-term aid flows are regarded as seriously deficient, with the target of 0.7%
of developed-country GDP for Official Development Assistance being met by only a few
Nordic countries.  Debt relief is also insufficient, though it would be of major importance, and
is not associated with improved access to developed-country markets, or with less trade policy
conditionality in developing countries.
Inappropriate domestic policies
Failure to maintain full utilisation of resources (as a primary objective), supplemented by
failure to control inflation and fiscal indiscipline, prevents sustained growth.  Moreover, there
is a vicious macro policy circle - retrenchment today leads to retrenchment tomorrow (in
contrast to the conventional argument that retrenchment today prepares the ground for growth
tomorrow).  This is largely because it involves cutting public investment in education and other
forms of human and physical infrastructure.
The Washington Consensus and the structuralists share a similar view of the consequences of
failure to develop human resources.  However, in trade and macro policies there are striking
contrasts between them.  On trade policy, in the Washington Consensus it is the lack of uniform
incentives which informs the diagnosis of policy failure, whereas in the structuralist view a
failed trade policy is one which is not intimately linked with the special problems of primary
commodity exports and the selective incentives required for the development of a
manufacturing sector.  On the question of macro policies, the Washington Consensus and the
structuralist views are similarly at loggerheads.  It is only in recent new growth theories
(reviewed in the next section) that conventional thinking has assimilated some of the arguments
concerning externalities and scale economies which underlie the structuralists' emphasis on
cumulative and circular causation.  As a consequence of these differences, there is a marked
divergence between the Washington Consensus and the structuralists not only on the right size
of aid transfers but also on the role of associated policy conditionality.
Testing the trade and macro policy failure hypothesis
This sub-section reports on some preliminary tests that have been made for a sample of 27
states (see Appendix 4) to illuminate some of the areas of controversy between these two
approaches. 
There is a substantial literature on testing the effects of trade policy on economic growth, some
of which was summarised in a recent report on the growth performance of mineral exporting
economies [Auty and Evans, 1993].  The methodology adopted by Auty and Evans for both
trade policy variables and macro performance indicators has been used in the present exercise.
On the trade policy side, the difference between domestic and world prices for imports is
5measured for the period 1973-91 and two sub-periods, 1973-81 and 1982-91, using mainly the
UNCTAD data set on trade control measures.  In each period, countries are classified into
groups of `low', `medium', `high' or `very high' protection.
The effect of macro policies was measured by calculating the real exchange rate index and
observing its trend and variation (standard error of estimate of trend).  In addition, the average
black market discount on the official exchange rate was calculated for those countries with the
necessary data.2 
The average growth rate of (constant-price) GDP in each time period was then regressed on the
trade policy, real exchange rate trend, real exchange rate variation, and black market discount
variables.  The results of these regressions are reported in Table 1.
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Real exchange rates are calculated in such a way that increases in the real exchange rate index indicate
appreciation, and decreases depreciation.  The black market discount (BMD) is given by the official exchange
rate divided by the black market exchange rate (the official and black market rates are both in terms of
domestic currency per US$).  The black market discount is available for the period 1973-83 only.
Table 1
Regression results
Constant X Coefficient R Squared
Growth against RER trend
1a) 1973-81 4.96 -18.50 0.09
(11.69)
1b) 1982-91 3.21 -2.65 0.01
(6.02)
1c) 1973-91 4.06 16.60 0.04
(17.11)
Growth against RER variation (ERV)
2a) 1973-81 5.35 -8.34 0.05
(7.39)
2b) 1982-91 4.38 -7.37 0.11
(4.25)
2c) 1973-91 4.87 -5.90* 0.17
(2.70)
Growth against protection
3a) 1973-81 4.45 0.02 3.56E-05
(0.52)
3b) 1982-91 2.78 0.20 0.01
(0.39)
3c) 1973-91 3.00 0.22 0.01
(0.40)
Growth against BMD
4 (1973-83) -1.61 7.48** 0.30
(2.42)
Notes: BMD = black market discount (official e-rate/black market e-rate) measured in local
currency/US$
Standard errors in brackets
** significant at the 1% level
* significant at the 5% level
6The regression results are illuminating in some respects, and give some support to the
Washington Consensus.  The black market discount variable (BMD) has a significant
coefficient with the expected positive sign (note that a higher value of BMD indicates a smaller
gap between the official and black market exchange rates).  Further, for the whole period the
exchange rate variability variable (ERV) has the expected sign and its coefficient is significant
at the 5% level. 
On the other hand, the trade policy results can be viewed as consistent with the structuralist
perspective.  In particular, the failure of the trade policy variable to be negatively related to
growth contradicts the Washington Consensus view that high protection has harmed growth.  It
thus leaves open the structuralist possibility that selective trade policy intervention can have
beneficial effects on growth, although there is no direct evidence in these results of positive
medium- to long-run benefits of infant industry protection.
The results for the real exchange rate trend are more puzzling.  Among other things, its lack of
influence on growth suggests that there were no Dutch Disease effects, which is at variance
with a considerable body of country case study literature - for example Bevan, Collier and
Gunning [1990].  However, there are two different effects which are not disentangled in the
regression analysis: mineral discoveries that result in a move toward a higher sustainable rate
of growth (for example, Botswana); and unsustainable mineral or commodity booms (such as
affected Kenya and Nigeria in the 1970s). 
What can be learned from new growth theory?
During the past five years or so, there has been a veritable explosion of work in the area of
`new growth theory' [surveyed by Shaw, 1992], which has brought development issues back to
the attention of mainstream economists, and revived interest in some old and unorthodox
strands of thought.  Some of the new work is of little or no relevance to the poorest countries,
for example because it is concerned with growth in developed countries, or with the creation
of new knowledge, or with steady-state models.  However, some of the insights and findings of
new growth theory seem highly relevant.
Convergence and non-convergence
The theoretical work has been associated with an empirical debate about whether or not there
is any general tendency for differences in per capita income among countries to shrink over
time, i.e. for countries to converge.  The debate has focused particularly on the period 1950-
90, using the purchasing power parity data set developed by Summers and Heston [1991],
though some studies have pursued smaller samples of countries much further back in time.
Most participants now accept that during 1950-90 there is no evidence of `unconditional
convergence' - no simple tendency for poorer countries to grow faster than (and hence to catch
up with) richer ones.  There clearly was convergence within the group of developed countries -
mainly a matter of catching up with the USA - and a few countries, epitomised by Korea and
Taiwan, made rapid progress from a much lower starting point.  Overall, however, the recent
historical record provides no reason to suppose that the problem of the poorest countries will
eventually go away of its own accord: countries that start at the bottom tend to stay at the
bottom.
7There remains a dispute about `conditional convergence', or the potential advantages of initial
backwardness, which creates an opportunity for rapid growth and catch-up, provided that
certain conditions and requirements are met.  The empirical case for conditional convergence
stems largely from a cross-country regression in Barro [1991], which relates growth of income
(per capita) during 1960-85 to: the level of income in 1960 (negatively); school enrolment in
1960 (positively); and the number of revolutions and coups during 1960-85 (negatively).  His
conclusion is that, for countries with initially high levels of education and stable political
systems, low initial income permits faster subsequent growth - a result which has been
repeated in many subsequent papers [for instance, Levine and Zervos, 1994:Table 4, and
Romer, 1993:17].
Barro's finding clearly gives more ground for hope about the prospects of the poorest
countries: catching-up is possible, and can be facilitated by the apparently simple strategy of
raising enrolment rates in primary and secondary schooling.  The same conclusion emerges
from work by Azariadis and Drazen [1990], who found that a necessary condition for rapid
growth was to start with an `overqualified' labour force (measured by the initial literacy rate
relative to initial per capita income).  On the other hand, the significance of Barro's
`revolutions and coups' variable is a salutary reminder of the profound political obstacles to
economic progress in many poor countries.
However, some economists reject Barro's `conditional convergence' result (the negative
coefficient on initial income), arguing that his regression is fundamentally mis-specified.3  In
particular, Friedman [1992] and Quah [1993a] maintain that it is in principle wrong (Galton's
fallacy) to draw inferences about convergence of levels from regressions of growth rates on
levels.  The correct approach is to look directly at what has happened to the dispersion of
levels over time.  When Quah [1993b] does this, he finds no evidence of convergence, even
conditional.  This finding does not mean that poor countries cannot catch up, for example by
investing heavily, but just that their poorness gives them no special advantage in this regard.
Investment and returns
Common to many strands of new growth theory is the view that investment is important - that
high rates of accumulation are vital to raising countries out of poverty.  This may not seem
surprising to development practitioners, or to theorists with non-neoclassical backgrounds, but
it is a sharp break from the `old' Solow model, in which growth depends on exogenous
technical progress, and investment plays only a transitional role.
The difference between the old and the new models arises essentially from their assumptions
about rates of return to investment.  In a Solow model, returns to investment are assumed to be
greatest at low per capita levels of capital (and income), and to decrease as capital per head
rises.  Hence, investing a given share of income each year would raise income by smaller and
smaller proportional amounts.  Correspondingly, if all countries were to invest an equal share
of income, poor countries would tend to catch up with rich ones.  In new growth models, by
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8contrast, returns to investment are assumed, for one reason or another, to be non-decreasing. 
As a result, a constant investment share can yield growth at a constant rate, and poor countries
need to invest more than rich countries to catch them up.
The view that rates of return are no higher, and perhaps lower, in poor countries than in rich
ones is of fundamental importance.  It undermines the common supposition that there is some
natural tendency for capital to flow from rich to poor countries - that foreign investment would
flood in if only administrative and political obstacles could be removed.  And it makes the task
of raising domestic savings (including public revenues for investment in education and
infrastructure) seem much more daunting.  The human and political costs of reducing
consumption are greater, the lower the level of living standards, and there is no compensating
incentive in the form of an unusually high rate of return.  It is thus all too easy to see how poor
countries may remain trapped at low levels of income, with escape to higher levels being the
exception rather than the rule.
Various reasons for non-decreasing returns have been proposed.  One class of reasons focuses
on investment in research and other forms of knowledge creation, though critics have argued
that it is not realistic to think of new knowledge as emerging from any particular sector or type
of activity.  More persuasive, and of more obvious relevance to poor countries, are the
explanations for non-decreasing returns which stress externalities.  Each act of physical
investment, for example, creates opportunities for further investments, and so on, in a never-
ending chain [Scott, 1992].  Similarly, the gains from educating and training workers spill over
to other workers, raising the productivity of their existing skills and increasing the rate at
which they learn new skills.  Or, to put it another way, the scarcity of skilled workers in poor
countries makes their social marginal product lower rather than higher than it would be if they
were more numerous.
There is a division of opinion in the new growth theory literature as to whether investment in
physical capital or in human resources matters most.  Advocates of the importance of physical
investment emphasise that there is a strong cross-country correlation between the share of
investment in GDP and the growth rate.  The association is especially strong for investment in
machinery and equipment [De Long and Summers, 1991].  The existence of this correlation is
not disputed, nor is its important lesson that large and sustained increases in output would be
inconceivable without a lot of physical investment.  However, there is much controversy about
its causal interpretation and policy implications.  There are widespread doubts that investment
itself could be the driving force, and even more reluctance to believe that raising investment
rates is sufficient to cause growth.
Greater importance has been attached to human capital formation in many formal models,
starting with that of Lucas [1988], an emphasis which has received support from the statistical
significance of education variables in the empirical work of Barro [1991] and others.  Among
other things, it has been argued that the returns to physical investment are generally low unless
the labour force possesses complementary skills, with a good basic education (and hence the
capacity to learn more specialised skills) being particularly important.  Thus a well-educated
labour force can provide an incentive for both domestic and foreign firms to invest.  Critics of
this view have noted, however, that education is not a sufficient condition for rapid growth -
counter-examples being Sri Lanka and the Philippines.
9Ideas and openness
In contrast to the emphasis on accumulation in most of new growth theory, Romer [1992, 1993]
has argued that `ideas' and `idea gaps' are what matter.  An idea is an input to production which
is distinguished from an `object' by being `non-rival'.  The use of an idea in one place or
activity, unlike that of a machine or a skilled worker, does not preclude its simultaneous use in
other places or activities.  This feature means that the diffusion of ideas is a powerful and low-
cost means of increasing output.
On this basis, Romer argues that `object gaps' are not the main reason why countries are poor,
and that accumulating more objects (including physical and human capital) is not the key to
growth, as evidenced, for example, by the poor economic performance of the Soviet Union
despite high investment in both material objects and education.  Poor countries suffer, he
argues, mainly from `idea gaps', and the few that have grown rapidly have done so
fundamentally by importing and using ideas from rich countries.  Thus, for instance, Romer
attributes the success of Mauritius as a garment exporter to the arrival of businessmen from
Hong Kong, whose specialised knowledge of production and marketing greatly increased the
economic value of local labour and capital.  More generally, Romer sees multinational
companies as the single most important channel for international transmission of ideas, and
views the development prospects of poor countries as depending heavily on their ability and
willingness to attract foreign investment.4
Romer's argument clearly contains an important element of truth - as did the rather similar
arguments of some earlier advocates of openness to trade as the key to growth, who
emphasised the acquisition of knowledge (both from importing and through the process of
exporting).  Yet it is also clearly not the whole of the truth.  Ability to attract foreign investment
often depends on prior object accumulation (Mauritius had a literate workforce and good
infrastructure).  Some countries, most notably Japan and Korea, have achieved spectacular
growth without foreign investment.  Conversely, there are many countries - most obviously in
Latin America, but also in much of Africa - where extensive involvement by multinational
companies over long periods has been associated with poor economic performance.
An intriguing gap
Nowhere in the voluminous literature on new growth theory, including the associated empirical
work, does there appear to be any mention of natural resources.  This is not hard to explain
from an analytical point of view: growth theory assigns a central role to the accumulation of
reproducible inputs (physical and human capital), while the supply of land is taken to be fixed.
 From a practical point of view, however, and particularly in the context of the present paper,
this omission seems more puzzling.  We know that the current economic situation of most poor
countries (and most poor people) is closely bound up in various ways with land, with other
natural resources, and with primary products.  Is it conceivable that this basic fact is of no
relevance to their future economic prospects?  Ricardo has been long forgotten!
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The Human Resource-Natural Resource Balance Hypothesis
The hypothesis is that countries with low levels of education but moderate amounts of land and
minerals get trapped at low levels of development.  It is this malign combination of human and
natural resources that lies at the root of the problems of the poorest countries.
A simple model of development
The essence of economic development is assumed to be accumulation of human skills.  The
most fundamental difference between developed and developing countries is the skill levels of
their labour forces [Wood, 1994b:chs 2, 3].  There is a strong cross-country correlation
between per capita income and average years of schooling - most poor countries have low
literacy rates - and heavy investment in education has been a feature of all cases of rapid and
sustained catching-up, most conspicuously in Japan and Korea.  However, formal schooling is
not a sufficient condition for acquiring economically useful skills: specific training and
practical experience are also needed to realise and develop the potential of educated labour.
A simple model of trade
There are two sorts of traded goods: primary products, including processed primary products
such as canned food; and manufactures, broadly defined to include traded services.  Production
of each of them requires two factors: skill (human resources), and land (natural resources), as
well as capital, which is internationally mobile, and so not a factor of production in the usual
sense.  [For a fuller account of the model and its assumptions, see Wood, 1994a, and Berge and
Wood, 1994.]
The essential distinction between the two goods is that primary production requires a lower
ratio of skill to land than manufacturing (at any given set of relative factor prices).  As a
consequence, for standard Heckscher-Ohlin reasons, comparative advantage is determined by
relative supplies of skill and land: countries with low ratios of human to natural resources tend
to export primary products, while those with high ratios of skill to land tend to export
manufactures.
Virtuous and vicious interactions
When put together, the model of development and the model of trade imply that the fortunes of
different countries are likely to diverge, depending on their natural resources.  Consider, in
particular, two countries with the same low initial level of skill per worker, but different
amounts of land per worker, which become open to trade as a result of reductions in artificial
or natural barriers.  Country A, with fewer natural resources, and so a higher skill/land ratio,
will become an exporter of manufactures, while country B, with a lower skill/land ratio
(though the same level of human resources) will become an exporter of primary products.
There are various familiar (structuralist) reasons why it may be disadvantageous to be an
exporter of primary products, including secularly declining terms of trade and world price
volatility.  However, the present pair of models conjures up a rather different, and potentially
more profound, disadvantage, which is that exporting primary products tends to retard skill
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acquisition, the most fundamental engine of development.  The reason is intuitively clear: trade
pushes countries with more natural resources into activities which are inherently less skill-
intensive.
The problem can be illustrated formally but simply by introducing supply elasticity into the
static Heckscher-Ohlin model, letting factor supplies respond to changes in factor prices, rather
than making endowments fixed.  This modification is particularly appropriate for skill, whose
supply is dependent on the decisions of households and firms.  H-O theory tells us that trade
affects factor prices, and more specifically that the abundant factor gains and the scarce factor
loses.  In country A, with the higher skill/land ratio, the abundant factor is skill, whose earnings
thus rise relative to those of land, causing an increase in its supply.  In country B, by contrast,
skill is the scarce factor, which suffers a reduction in earnings as a result of trade, and whose
supply thus tends to contract.
The effect of trade is therefore to enlarge the initial difference in the skill/land ratio between
the two countries.  Indeed, in this hypothetical case, trade creates a difference in the absolute
level of skill which was not there initially.  Why should this matter?  Trading in accordance
with comparative advantage is efficient, and the supply response ought to make it even more
efficient.  However, new growth theory and common sense both suggest that this static
evaluation of the outcome is misleading, because it ignores important features of the process of
skill acquisition, and in particular various externalities which generate increasing returns at the
aggregate level.
Some of these externalities are to be found within the sphere of formal education, such as the
effects of the education of parents on the school performance of their children.  The rest are in
post-school training and learning from experience, such as the skills which workers learn from
one another.  Their common feature is that skill acquisition is a cumulative and interactive
process: the more skills you have to begin with, and the more skilled the people around you,
the better your chances of acquiring more knowledge and expertise.  As a result, trade-induced
increases and reductions in skill supplies are likely to be perpetuated and amplified, with
substantial effects on longer-term development.
Theory and reality
All this, of course, assumes that other things are equal.  Thus a country with few natural
resources might happen for cultural reasons to be opposed to female education, while one with
more natural resources might also have a government which for ideological reasons gave high
priority to schooling, making the outcome quite different from the simple tale of countries A
and B above.5  The tale may also be misleading for countries with really large natural resource
endowments - such as Botswana and Kuwait - which are able to finance rapid expansion of
education.
The issue is thus whether, and to what extent, the simplified pattern of causation suggested here
can be discerned through all the complications of reality.  Two well-known recent pieces of
                                                                                                                                                       
5 However, it is worth bearing in mind that culture and politics may be influenced by resources, rather than
being exogenous: for example, the political case for educational expansion is weaker where there are fewer
industrial jobs for educated workers.
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empirical work on growth provide it with striking, albeit unwitting, support.  One is Barro
[1991:435-6], who found that the long-term growth rates of Africa and Latin America were
inexplicably low, after controlling for many influences, including initial levels of education and
income, and political instability.  What these two continents have in common, however, is
unusually large amounts of natural resources per worker.  Their mysteriously low growth rates
could thus be explained by their unusually low initial ratios of skill to land.
The other piece of evidence comes from the East Asia Miracle study of the World Bank
[1993:Table A6.3], which found that total factor productivity growth is positively correlated
with the share of manufactures in exports, again after controlling for a range of other influences.
 If this finding is combined with the present hypothesis that the share of manufactures in exports
is fundamentally determined by a country's ratio of skill to land (and not, as the Bank study
implies, a matter of policy choice), it seems eminently consistent with the conclusion that long-
term development tends to be adversely affected by generous endowments of natural resources.
The idea that natural resources may be more of a curse than a blessing is not, in itself, a new
one.  Mahon [1992] is the latest of several authors (cited in his article) to attribute the poor
economic performance of Latin America, as compared with East Asia, to their differing natural
resources.  Likewise, Auty [1993b] argues that the uneven economic performance of six large
newly industrialising countries was mainly a result of the adverse effects of richer natural
resources.  Other work by Auty [1993a], and by Gelb [1988], alleges under-performance in
mineral economies, especially oil exporters, for reasons explored in the extensive and long-
established literature on Dutch disease [e.g. Daniel, 1986, 1992].
What distinguishes the present hypothesis from these earlier contributions are two related
points.  First, its argument that what matters is not the absolute amount of natural resources, but
the ratio of land to skill: this means that the `resource curse' can operate in countries with only
moderate natural resources, if they have even fewer human resources - or, in other words, that
this is a widespread problem of poor countries, not simply one confined to rich mineral
economies.  The second distinguishing feature of the present hypothesis is its argument that the
`curse' operates basically by long-term retardation of the process of skill acquisition, rather
than through the various other (mainly shorter-term) mechanisms suggested in the literature.
Testing the hypothesis
Methodology
A proper test of this hypothesis would have to include several ingredients.  One is to check its
explanation of trade, and in particular its contention that the shares of manufactures and primary
products in a country's exports are determined mainly by the country's ratio of human to natural
resources.  Results for the largest possible sample of countries strongly support this contention
[Wood, 1994a:Figure 5], but it remains to examine the situation of the poorest countries more
closely.
A second obvious ingredient is to test, both for the poorest countries and more generally,
whether low human-to-natural resource ratios are associated with low growth, controlling for
other relevant influences.  If this is so, a third step would be to investigate whether this
association is generated by the hypothesised mechanism - retardation of skill formation.
This third step would need to be subdivided: the comparatively easy aspect would be to
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examine progress in formal education, asking whether this was slower in countries with low
initial skill/land ratios; the other and much harder aspect would be to examine the rate and
determinants of progress in other sorts of skill acquisition.  Though total factor productivity
growth calculations may be interpreted as providing some indirect evidence on this latter
aspect, it is doubtful that much progress could be made by standard cross-country or time-
series statistical methods, simply because there is not enough data on skills acquired outside
the formal education system.
An alternative and better approach, which could throw light also on other aspects of the
hypothesised set of relationships, would be case studies of specific countries.  It would be
particularly interesting to make a close examination of countries and regions whose experience
seems to contradict the hypothesis - both those that have prospered despite having low ratios of
human to natural resources (such as Botswana, and historically the USA), and those that have
stayed poor despite high human/natural resource ratios (such as Sri Lanka and the Indian state
of Kerala).6
A preliminary attempt has been made to test these hypotheses.  This has involved relating
human and natural resource endowments to income, growth and trade.  The results, which are
presented in this section, seem sufficiently interesting to warrant further investigation, but the
picture is clearly not simple!
Variables and samples
Human resource endowment is measured by years of schooling, and natural resource
endowment by total land area.  Total land is a crude measure of natural resources, but it is an
unbiased measure since a country with a larger land area is more likely to be endowed with the
various types of natural resources.7
Two samples were used: 
• a larger group (88 countries - see Appendix 4), consisting of those countries in
Barro's growth regression [Barro, 1991:Table 1, regression 1] for which data on
average years of schooling for 1960 were available;
• a smaller group (43 countries - see Appendix 4) of the countries used in the
                                                                                                                                                       
6 It is interesting and perhaps not coincidental that both Sri Lanka and Kerala, though not all that well
endowed with natural resources by global standards, experienced integration into the world economy as
exporters of particular primary products a long time ago.  This historical accident may have irreversibly tilted
their economic structures (and in particular the priorities and specialised skills of their entrepreneurs and
traders, domestic and foreign) away from other activities such as manufacturing.
7 We experimented with a more detailed breakdown of natural resources (oil and gas reserves, mineral
reserves and arable land) in the regression of export composition against resource endowments, but the
coefficients were insignificant and the fit improved only marginally.  It may be worth testing whether a more
detailed breakdown of natural resources would affect the results in the growth regression.
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analysis of export diversification in the next section for which data from Barro
[1991] and data on average years of schooling in 1960 were available.
For more details on definition of variables, data sources and samples see Appendix 1.
Income, growth and human resources
Simple scatters of income against human resources
The strong correlation between income levels and human resources is readily observable from
Figure 1, which shows real per capita GDP in 1985 against mean years of schooling in 1985
(the latest available year).
Figure 2 shows how changes in income are linked to changes in human resources over time by
relating average annual growth rates of per capita GDP between 1960 and 1985 to absolute
changes in average years of schooling over the same period.  The reason for mixing absolute
and proportionate changes in the comparison is that problems were identified when using either
absolute or percentage changes in both variables.  Some countries with low average years of
schooling in 1960 have had enormous increases in percentage terms.  When absolute change in
per capita GDP was related to absolute changes in average school years, the increases in
developed-country GDP dwarfed the effects of changes in average years of schooling on per
capita income in developing countries. 
Figure 2 does suggest that larger increases in average years of schooling have been associated
with higher growth rates, although the correlation is not as striking as that between levels of
GDP and human resources in Figure 1. There are also some conspicuous outliers in Figure 2. 
• Zaïre, Zambia, Ghana and Venezuela all have moderate increases in education, but
negative growth rates.  Note that all are exporters mainly of primary products.
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• By contrast, growth was much faster than would have been predicted from the rise
in education in Singapore and Hong Kong.  (Singapore and Zaïre both increased
their average years of schooling by about 1.5 years, but their annual average growth
rates differ by at least 8%.) 
However, the countries which have been able to grow fast without increasing their human
resources seem to have had the advantage of starting off with high levels of education. Average
years of schooling were 5.2 years for Hong Kong and 3.0 years for Singapore in 1960, high
levels for developing countries at the time.
Although Figures 1 and 2 show a strong correlation between the skill level of the population
and per capita income, there is a problem of determining the direction of causality.  It may be
argued that at higher levels of GDP countries can afford to invest more in education.  Similarly
in relation to Figure 2, countries which are growing faster can also afford to increase
expenditure on education.
Explaining growth in terms of human resources
To overcome the causality problem it is necessary to employ a more sophisticated method of
testing.  Relating initial levels of human capital to subsequent growth rates allows for a better
assessment of the direction of causality.  (The chronology of these variables implies that
causality can only run from human capital to growth, not vice versa.) 
The following takes as its starting point Robert Barro's growth regression [Barro, 1991:Table
1, regression 1].  Barro regresses average annual per capita GDP growth (1960-85) on, among
other variables, initial (1960) level of human capital and initial GDP.  He finds growth to be
positively related to initial levels of human capital (measured by enrolment rates) and
negatively related to initial levels of per capita GDP.  However, there is a problem with using
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enrolment rates as a measure of human capital since they measure the flow of investment in
human capital rather than its initial stock.  As Barro points out, the positive effects of enrolment
rates could reflect a favourable situation that shows up in high investment in human capital as
well as in rapid growth of GDP.
Replicating Barro's equation, but using data on educational stocks, would help solve the
problem of third-factor-causality. This was done using recently available data on the
educational attainment of the adult population [Barro and Lee, 1993]. The stock of human
capital, reflected in average years of schooling, takes a long time to build up.  If a favourable
situation were to be the simultaneous cause of high growth rates and high levels of human
capital, it would have had to have been in existence for the 20-40 years prior to 1960 as well
as in subsequent decades, which is unlikely (but not impossible, especially if the relevant
influences were political or cultural). 
The main regression results, summarised below, refer to the 88-country sample.  The same
regressions were also run for the reduced sample of 43, but this made little difference to the
results.  Regression results for both samples are reported in full in Appendix 2, Table A1.
Using average years of schooling rather than enrolment rates makes little difference to the
regression results.8 The coefficient on average years of schooling (AVSY60) is positive and
significant.  It is smaller than that on primary and secondary enrolment, but this is due to
differences in the units of measurement.  In other words, a one-year increase in average years
of schooling embodies a larger increase in human capital than does a one percentage point
increase in the primary or secondary enrolment rate.
Using both initial GDP and initial level of human resources as independent variables in a
multiple regression tests the impact of human resources on growth holding income level
constant.  The positive effect of human resources on growth in the regression cannot, therefore,
be attributed to differences in income levels.  Hence, the finding is not subject to indeterminate
causality, as was the case with the scatter diagrams.  The result shows that the initial level of
human resources has a positive and significant effect on growth.
Human resource accumulation, trade and endowments
The hypothesis suggests that accumulation of human resources is affected by countries' relative
endowments of human and natural resources.  The mechanism operates through countries
trading according to their comparative advantage.
Relating trade to endowment ratios
Figure 3, which distinguishes between low-income countries (as defined in The World
Development Report 1992) and other countries, shows (a) the ratio of exports of manufactured
goods to exports of primary products against (b) a simple measure of the ratio of human to
natural resources (number of school years per square kilometre - which is the same thing as
average years of schooling per person multiplied by population density).  Both ratios are
measured on a (natural) log scale.  They are clearly strongly correlated, supporting the present
hypothesis about the determinants of trade.
                                                                                                                                                       
8 This applies to both samples.
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Being a low-income country is not synonymous with being a primary exporter.  Although the
low-income countries are concentrated in the lower left-hand quadrant of the scatter, there are
many middle-income countries with high ratios of primary to manufactured exports.  Nor does
being an exporter of manufactured goods ensure a high income level, as the cases of Haiti and
Bangladesh attest.
Figure 4 traces the change in trade patterns and resource endowments over time (between 1960
and 1989), for 39 of the countries (see Appendix 4) in the 47-country sample (data for 7
countries were incomplete and Hong Kong, as an outlier, was omitted to improve legibility of
the rest).  We can see from the general pattern of these lines that rises in the ratio of
manufactured to primary exports are generally associated with rising skill to land ratios. 
However, the figure also suggests that there are other important influences on changes in the
pattern of trade, the most obvious possibility being changes in trade policy.  For example, the
long upward trajectories of the countries to the right of the figure suggest realisation of a
previously latent comparative advantage in manufactures, as a result of more open trade
policies.  The figure highlights the scope for further analysis. 
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Relating growth to endowment ratios
The hypothesis suggests that having a lower ratio of human to natural resources ceteris paribus
results in lower growth.  A direct test was made for this relationship between growth and
endowment ratios.
¨ Regional averages:
A preliminary overview of the relation between growth and other indicators in low-
income countries is provided by regional comparisons, using sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia as proxies for the poorest countries.  Table 2 shows that income and human capital
levels are similar in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.  Yet South Asia has grown much
faster than sub-Saharan Africa.  Other marked differences between the two regions
illustrated in the table are:
• in the ratio of human to natural resources: South Asia has a much higher ratio of
school years to land, with 538 years of schooling per km2 compared to sub-Saharan
Africa's 34;
• in the share of primary goods in total exports: primary commodities account for
92% of exports in sub-Saharan Africa, but only 30% in South Asia. 
Export composition against e
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These figures are consistent with the hypothesis that the poor countries which have been
getting poorer are those with low ratios of human to natural resources (and consequently
high proportions of primary commodities in their exports).
¨ Regression:
The hypothesis that endowment ratios affect growth may be tested more formally by
regressing growth on the ratio of human to natural resources.  The Barro-type growth
regression used in the preceding section is employed again to control for other influences. 
In this case, the ratio of human to natural resources is added as an independent variable. 
The regression then becomes one of growth against per capita GDP in 1960, average years
of schooling in 1960, share of government expenditure in income, political instability, and
resource endowment ratio. 
This regression was run for the 88-country sample (see Appendix 2, Table A2(i), for full
results).  The ratio of human to natural resource endowments has a positive and significant
(at the 5% level) effect on the growth rate.  If average years of schooling is excluded from
the regression, the level of significance of the resource ratio increases to 1%.  If,
alternatively, the human/natural resource ratio is replaced by our measure of natural
resource endowments alone (log of land per person), its coefficient is also significant (at
the 5% level).9
These results give some support to the hypothesis that abundant natural resources, relative
to human resources, tend to retard the pace of economic development.  However, the effect,
as measured by these regressions, appears quite small.  For example, the regressions
                                                                                                                                                       
9 Barro found dummies for Africa and Latin America to be significant in explaining per capita growth.  It
was expected that including the endowment ratio or the land variable would render them insignificant, but this
was not the case, which could mean either that our measure of natural resources is imperfect, or that the
unusually slow growth of these two regions has causes other than natural resource abundance.  The results are
presented in full in Appendix 2, Table A2(ii).
Table 2
Income and resource indicators in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
Similarities:
Per capita income level (US$) 330 340
Illiteracy rate (%) 53 50
Mean years of schooling 2.4 1.6
Differences:
Per capita income growth (1965-90) 1.9 0.2
Population per km2 224 21
School years per km2 (mean years of schooling x population per km2) 538 34
Primary share of exports (%) 30 92
Sources: World Bank, 1992a:Tables 1 and 16; UNDP, 1992:Table 25.
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suggest that a ten-fold increase in the area of land per person in a country would reduce its
annual growth rate by only about half of one percentage point.
Relating human resource accumulation to trade
The final part of the hypothesis to be tested concerns the mechanism by which initial resource
endowments affect growth. It is suggested that this mechanism involves the influence of
endowments on the composition of trade, which in turn influences the accumulation of human
resources.
One way of testing the effects of the human/natural resource ratio on accumulation of human
resources is to run cross-country regressions of the change in average years of schooling on the
initial endowment ratio.  Similarly, the effects of trade on accumulation of human resources can
be tested by regressing changes in average years of schooling on the composition of trade
during the period concerned.
The regressions are presented in full in Appendix 2, Table A3.  The results give weak support
to the hypothesis that a higher initial human/natural resource ratio has a favourable impact on
the subsequent accumulation of human resources.  For the 88-country sample, the coefficient on
the log of the resource ratio is positive and significant at the 10% level.  (Using a
developing-country-only sample (n=68 - see Appendix 4), the coefficient maintained its sign
but lost all significance.)
Similarly, the impact of the trade ratio on the accumulation of human resources is weak.  The
impact was significant (at the 10% level) only when the log of the end-of-period trade ratio
was used.
In all these regressions, incidentally, the initial level of income has a positive and significant
effect, at the 10% level, on change in average years of schooling.  The initial level of schooling
has a negative but insignificant effect.
A more sophisticated model might or might not reveal a stronger relationship between the
human/natural resource ratio and subsequent accumulation of human resources.  As noted
earlier, ideology and culture also have a significant impact on education policy and human
resource accumulation.  Moreover, countries with abundant natural resources, such as oil, can
afford to invest heavily in education, as the Gulf states and Norway have.
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The Export Diversification Hypothesis
The potential importance of the commodity composition of exports as a determinant of
economic growth is supported both by the structuralist critique and by empirical analysis of
world price trends over the past two to three decades.  Countries that have been able to export
manufactures, for example, have been trading in a more buoyant market for much of the period
than have most countries exporting mainly primaries.  To what extent, therefore, can economic
stagnation be linked to a country's failure to alter the structure of its exports?
The broad assumptions of the hypothesis are that: the proximate cause of the poorest countries'
problems is their failure to diversify out of exports with poor market prospects into items with
a more dynamic outlook; and that there may be common underlying causes of this failure.  This,
it should be emphasised, is not simply a matter of failure to diversify out of primaries into
manufactures.  The primary commodity markets are variegated, and the failure to diversify is as
much within as between broad product groups.  The situation is most clearly described by
examining hard and soft commodities separately.
Minerals
Product differentiation
It is frequently argued that the international trade outlook for primary commodities is so bad
that poor primary exporters have no choice but to diversify their sources of export earnings as
soon as possible.  This is a very strong assertion and requires examination.  In particular, the
question that needs to be asked of countries with deposits of a wide range of minerals (which
would include, for example, most states of Southern Africa) is whether it is diversification out
of minerals or diversification into new minerals that is most appropriate.
In what follows, the discussion is confined to primary mineral commodities: exports of the
derivatives of exhaustible mineral resources in `first saleable product' form - that is, without
processing beyond the minimum stage necessary to find a sale on an international market.  The
range of these commodities is much wider than is sometimes supposed.  Although by value
world production of metal minerals is dominated by five commodities (copper, gold,
aluminium, iron ore and zinc), there are at least 17 other mineral commodities for which the
value of annual production exceeds US$ 1 billion.  In addition, there are oil and gas - often
treated differently, but presenting many of the same economic policy problems. 
The range of minerals includes:
• energy minerals: coal, petroleum (including natural gas) and uranium;
• precious minerals: diamonds and gemstones, gold, silver and platinum group metals
(PGMs);
• non-ferrous base metals: copper, nickel, bauxite, lead, zinc, tin, etc.;
• iron ore;
• specialty minerals: heavy minerals (titanium ores, rare earths), tungsten, cobalt,
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chrome, etc.;
• industrial minerals: phosphates, soda ash, potash, building materials (especially
high value ones, such as marble), filtration minerals (e.g. diatomite), processing
materials (graphite, industrial diamonds).
Although each of these has in common the economic properties of minerals - exhaustibility,
resource rent and natural monopoly in efficient exploitation of an individual deposit - they have
differing market characteristics.  Most of them are widely traded on international markets and
priced internationally as traded goods (not subject to mark-up pricing by supplier cartels).  The
predominant exception to the pricing rule is, of course, diamonds.
Market trends are not likely to be uniform across the whole range.  The declining material
intensity of economic growth in the main importing markets may be a phenomenon especially
affecting only base metals and iron ore.  One possibility for poor, mineral-rich countries may
be diversification into other types of mineral exports.
The analysis of mineral-exporting countries that have failed to grow should not, therefore,
accept as a simple fact the proposition that adverse market conditions are responsible.  In
cases where there are exploitable deposits of minerals with better market prospects than the
traditional exports, and where diversification has not occurred, the question to be asked is why.
 And in cases where the traditional exports have faced adverse market trends, the question to
be asked is whether these have had similar effects on all exporters.  In some cases of minerals
facing relatively declining international markets (decline in consumption per unit of industrial
country GDP), there has been a marked shift in the regional pattern of revealed comparative
advantage in mineral production.  The obvious case of this is in the production of copper,
where Africa's share has markedly declined while Chile's has grown rapidly and even
production in supposedly `high-cost' North American mines has revived sharply in the past
decade.
The next question is to ask why, if mineral production is a cul-de-sac from the economic
development point of view, there exist large, growing and profitable international companies
which have not diversified out of mineral production.  If anything, a reduction of diversity has
taken place in recent years in the activity portfolios of, say, BHP, RTZ, Placer, Newmont and,
in a somewhat different vein, the Anglo-South African mining finance houses.  All of them have
become more, not less, concentrated on primary mineral production.
Reasons for differences in country experience
Is it possible that the answer lies in a global reallocation of mineral rents since the mid-1970s?
 In parallel with Western economic policies and technological developments that have helped
to depress mineral consumption and prices has gone reduction in host-country taxation, most
strongly exemplified in Chile, where mining is taxed no differently from any other kind of
business activity.  On the other hand, the answer may simply lie in the ability of such
companies to operate internationally and to move more quickly out of unprofitable minerals
(such as bauxite) into, say, precious metals than is possible for a nation state.
There are not only successful mining companies.  `Successful' mining countries (in terms of
mineral output growth, attracting investment and market share) in the developing world include
Chile, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Botswana.  The first two are also well-diversified
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into manufacturing activities.  Chile and Papua New Guinea (and Indonesia to a lesser extent)
built their mining sectors around the very base metals that represent a cul-de-sac for, say, Zaïre
and Zambia.  Why the difference?
It is useful to consider an ideal `life-cycle' (Dudley Seers' term with reference to Trinidad) for
a mineral-exporting economy:
1. Exploration is encouraged by reform of the regulatory and taxation frameworks, and by the
offer of risk-reducing operating conditions to private investors (foreign exchange retention,
freedom to market, to import inputs, expatriate skills, etc.).  Where non-fungible aid
allocations are available for exploration work, these are used to enhance the state's claim
on a share of rents.
2. If discoveries are made, and project construction begins, countervailing macro-economic
policies are quickly put in place to minimise `Dutch Disease'.
3. The taxation regime is maintained at a level and structure expected to maximise the
discounted present value of fiscal receipts from mining (i.e. a balance between stimulating
new investment and taking the largest possible share from existing mines).
4. Revenues are saved offshore because of domestic absorptive capacity problems that limit
non-inflationary expenditure on physical and social infrastructure, or where reductions in
other personal and corporate taxation are not expected to lead to real accumulation of
capital in non-mineral activities.
5. The long-term objective is both to maximise mineral revenues and to reduce the share of
mineral activity in GDP and exports over time.  Present wisdom would suggest that this
should be done by emphasising expenditure on human capital, while reducing barriers to
investment in other traded goods and services.  It might also involve enhancing the
administrative capacities of the state and providing adequate social insurance for those
eventually displaced from declining mining industries.
Does the apparent worsening of trade prospects for some minerals suggest that countries should
follow other steps?  The case of the existing large, high-cost base metal industries of, say,
Zambia and Zaïre may be different, but given that Zambia has hardly been explored for 25
years its future mineral potential may be considerable.  The problem is the starting point: past
Dutch Disease has left the rest of the Zambia economy as scorched earth.  It is necessary to
distinguish between the problems of declining industries in declining markets, and the
management of mineral development where a significant probability of generation of mineral
rents is estimated.  A great deal of research has been carried out on the management of mineral
economies when booms occur [e.g. Gelb, 1988; Daniel, 1992]; similar attention is now needed
to the pre-conditions for growth (and, where appropriate, diversification) of the mineral sector




The soft commodities markets, like those for minerals, have seen substantial price falls as a
result of excess supply.  But, as in the case of minerals, the overall picture hides a varied
pattern, with some commodities experiencing far better price trends than others, at least in
some markets.  This suggests the need for a similar re-assessment of the conventional
hypothesis on the causes of economic problems of primary exporters.  Just as with mineral
exporting states, it is not sufficient to explain the poorest countries' economic problems simply
by the fact that they have been major agricultural exporters during the worst slump in world
commodity prices this century.  Rather, it is necessary to explain not only why they have failed
to diversify out of agricultural products but, additionally, why they have failed to diversify
from the worst affected agricultural products into those that have been less badly affected.  The
answer to the second question may be physical (perhaps it is not possible to grow cherry
tomatoes in the geographically most accessible areas of Côte d'Ivoire), but it may also be
policy related.
The troubles of the international agricultural markets over the past decade or so hardly need
elaboration.  But, as the following figures indicate, not all agricultural commodities have fared
identically.  During the period 1980-87 there was an average annual fall in world food prices
of 10.1% (against a rise of only 1% annually over the period 1962-80).  In the case of tropical
beverages the fall was 2.4% (as opposed to an annual rise of 2.9% over the period 1962-80),
while for agricultural raw materials the fall was 4.2% (following a rise of 0.5% in the
previous period) [Maizels, 1992:Table 1.2]. 
It is helpful to distinguish between three broad groups of agricultural commodities in terms of
the prices that have prevailed in some of the markets accessible by some of the poorest
countries.  These are:
• cereals and other food crops produced behind protective barriers in OECD states;
• `traditional tropical' agricultural products (such as beverages and oils);
• foodstuffs that may be produced in both OECD and developing countries, most
notably those that are seasonal in the former, such as some vegetables and flowers.
The first group has seen the most severe falls in world prices, while the third group has seen
prices in some markets maintained or even increased.
The relationship between these three groups of commodities, and the implications for
developing countries, are illustrated in Figures 5-7.  Figure 5 plots the intra-sectoral net barter
terms of trade between sub-Saharan Africa's cereal imports and its beverage exports during the
period 1961-90.  The dominant picture presented is of substantial short-term variations with a
favourable long-term trend.  For the first half of the 1980s, at least, the net barter terms of trade
between beverage exports and cereal imports moved in Africa's favour, reflecting the fact that
the slump in world beverages prices was more than matched by the decline in world cereal
prices (because of protectionism and dumping by OECD states).
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Figure 6 provides a similar analysis of intra-sectoral net barter terms of trade, but between the
cereal imports of sub-Saharan Africa and its `non-traditional' agricultural exports.  The main
differences are that only exports to the EU have been taken into account and, because of this,
the time period is much shorter (1980-90) because European trade statistics do not distinguish
between all the commodities covered in the earlier period.  As with beverages, the movement
in the terms of trade appears to be cyclical rather than linear, but the favourable movement for
much of the 1980s for sub-Saharan Africa is considerably more marked.
The reason for this is that all of the countries in the sub-Saharan Africa category have
favourable access to the EU market for some horticultural and floricultural products (South
Africa does not, but is excluded from the sub-Saharan Africa aggregate).  Although subject to
tariff quotas in many cases, those sub-Saharan African exports that do gain access to the
European market benefit from the artificially high prices maintained by the Common
Agricultural Policy's protectionism.
Country differentiation
Figures 7a and 7b show the overall effect on the net barter terms of trade for food of Africa
(Northern and Southern) and a selection of countries in Asia and South America for two time
periods.  A substantial majority of African states have seen a favourable movement in their
intra-sectoral terms of trade over the past three decades.  In this they have tended to fare better
than South Asia and South America; all countries in the first group and just over half of the
second experienced an unfavourable movement.  However, the greatest gains, both absolutely
and relative to the performance of other regions, seem to have occurred during the 1960s and
1970s.  Fewer African states (but still a majority) saw a favourable movement during the
1980s; by contrast, this decade was more favourable for South Asia and South America. 
As in the case of minerals, therefore, it has been possible for some countries to do better with a
given set of market constraints than others.  Not all of the sub-Saharan African countries that
are able physically to export non-traditional agricultural products have actually diversified. 
The most prominent diversifiers have been Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland (although possibly as a
front for South African produce), Zimbabwe and, surprisingly, Ethiopia.  The West African
states have been prominent by their failure to diversify.  Indeed, there has been a decline in
some horticultural product exports from francophone West Africa.
Testing the hypothesis
There are at least three aspects to the diversification question:
• inter-sectoral diversification (e.g. from primaries to manufactures);
• intra-sectoral diversification (from low-priced mineral or soft commodities to
those with better market prospects);
• market diversification (from slow growing markets, such as the EU for traditional
primaries, to more rapidly growing markets).
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The analysis so far has not dealt with the third aspect - market diversification.  It is hoped to do
so later (subject to the resolution of practical problems identified in the final section).
Which countries?
The selection of countries for analysis in this part of the work was made on a pragmatic, multi-
step basis.  The methodology was tested on small initial samples of 12 and then 27 countries
(see Appendix 4), and then extended to a group that includes a substantial proportion of
developing countries other than the smallest.  This group, which forms the basis for the
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following tables, totals 47 states10 (Appendix 4).  They include lldcs, MICs and NICs.  It is the
first of these only that is of direct interest to the authors; states in the other two groups are
included for comparison.
A number of illustrative features of the 47 states are presented in Table 3, which shows that we
are dealing with a mixed bunch of countries.  GNP per capita ranges from $13,430 to $100
(current US$, 1991), and average annual export growth from 20% to -4.6%.  Twenty-one states
have a share of non-fuel primaries in total exports exceeding two-thirds, while for eight states
the share of manufactures exceeds this level.
To facilitate comparison, the states were divided into four sub-groups on the basis, first, of
GNP per capita and, second, within each group so defined, GDP growth.  The unweighted
mean 1991 GNP per capita of all 47 states was $1,399.  The 17 states with a per capita GNP
above this level were identified, and an unweighted mean of their 1980-90 GDP growth was
calculated; states with a growth rate exceeding this level were put into one sub-group and those
with a lower figure were put into another.  This process was repeated for the 30 states with a
per capita GNP below the mean.  This process resulted in four sub-groups:
• Group 1 - richer, faster growing;
• Group 2 - richer, slower growing;
• Group 3 - poorer, faster growing;
• Group 4 - poorer, slower growing.
There are some clear differences (apart from wealth) between the groups.  Agriculture's share
of GDP in the richer groups is much lower (at 10% and 13%) than in the poorer groups (30%
and 37%), while that of industry is higher.  The rate of export growth declines monotonically
from Group 1 to Group 4, while the share of non-fuel primaries rises.  Hence, the poorer states
(Groups 3 and 4) have experienced both lower export growth and a higher dependence on
primaries than have the richer states, even those that have grown relatively slowly.
The database
The primary reason for the focus on product rather than market diversification is that the work
was based on an analysis of EU import statistics.  A key assumption is that there may exist
substantial differences between the market characteristics of the items falling within the same
trade nomenclature aggregates.  In other words, an analysis that is limited to broad product
groups (such as `agricultural commodities' and `minerals', or even `food' or `cereals') may fail
to recognise a genuine diversification between items within such aggregates with distinct sets
of market characteristics.  Hence, the analysis has to be undertaken at as high a level of product
disaggregation as is feasible.  This is much easier to do if it is organised around one importing
                                                                                                                                                       
10 This sample of 47 states was derived from an initial list of 69 developing countries (see Appendix 4),
which had been produced after the exclusion of some states without scrutiny on the assumption that data would
be scarce or particularly unreliable, or that they had experienced known abnormal conditions during the review
period (e.g. Laos, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique).  For 14 of these 69 states, recent GNP per capita or
GDP growth data were unavailable, and so they were excluded.  A further eight of the 69 states were excluded
because of the low proportion of their exports that is directed towards the EU (for reasons explained below). 
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state's statistics rather than one of the available databases that combine exporting state figures,
since these tend to be organised at a relatively high level of aggregation.
Table 3
Selected characteristics of the sample states
GNP GDP Share in GDP(a) of: Export growth Share in exports(a) of:
per capita growth agriculture industry (av.ann.change) non-fuel primaries manufactures
(current $) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1991 1980-90 1976-91
Group 1
Botswana 2,530 11.3 6.5 69.3 17.5 n/a n/a
Thailand 1,570 7.6 15.1 47.2 16.2 32.3 66.7
Hong Kong 13,430 7.1(b) 0.3 25.2 17.7 3.7 95.7
Mauritius 2,410 6.0 11.0 32.7 10.7 69.7 30.3
Malaysia 2,520 5.2 22.7 41.6 13.2 23.5 61.0
Turkey 1,780 5.1 17.8 33.7 13.8 30.8 66.9
Tunisia 1,500 3.6 18.0 31.5 11.5 13.5 67.9
Unweighted mean 13.1 40.2 14.4 28.9 64.8
Group 2
Chile 2,160 3.2 6.5 40.9 10.1 84.4 15.1
Algeria 1,980 3.1 14.1 49.7 6.0 0.9 2.2
Costa Rica 1,850 3.0 16.9 26.4 6.3 72.8 26.2
Brazil 2,940 2.7 10.2 38.6 8.0 42.7 56.0
Jamaica 1,480 1.6 6.9 47.4 3.8 41.4 56.4
South Africa 2,560 1.3 5.0 43.8 7.3 n/a n/a
Venezuela 2,730 1.0 5.1 47.9 3.2 9.5 12.1
Uruguay 2,840 0.3 12.7 33.8 7.2 59.5 40.5
Panama 2,130 0.2 10.5 12.6 20.0 77.8 21.9
Argentina 2,790 -0.4 14.5 39.6 7.7 65.5 28.2
Unweighted mean 10.2 38.1 8.0 50.5 28.7
Group 3
Pakistan 400 6.3 25.6 25.6 11.4 26.8 72.2
India 330 5.3 32.2 27.9 8.0 24.5 72.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 610 5.0 18.1 29.7 4.0 29.3 40.7
Nepal 180 4.6 59.0 14.3 5.9 11.9 88.1
Burkina Faso 290 4.3 43.6 19.7 8.5 87.8 12.2
Bangladesh 220 4.3 38.3 16.8 10.7 29.1 70.3
Kenya 340 4.2 26.6 22.4 2.3 67.2 20.2
Morocco 1,030 4.0 n/a n/a 8.6 46.0 51.2
Table 3 (continued)
GNP GDP Share in GDP(a) of: Export growth Share in exports(a) of:
per capita growth agriculture industry (av.ann.change) non-fuel primaries manufactures
(current $) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1991 1980-90 1976-91
Group 3 (continued)
Sri Lanka 500 4.0 26.9 25.0 8.9 35.1 64.4
Burundi 210 3.9(b) 54.6 16.0 3.2 97.7 2.3
Colombia 1,260 3.7 18.8 40.7 8.5 37.9 33.3
Senegal 720 3.0 26.9 27.2 3.8 65.3 22.9
Ghana 400 3.0 59.4 6.5 1.6 98.2 1.1
Zimbabwe 650 2.9 19.5 31.7 4.7 67.3 32.0
Malawi 230 2.9 35.3 19.5 7.3 96.1 3.8
Uganda 170 2.8 51.4 11.8 -4.0 99.3 0.3
Tanzania 100 2.8 60.8 5.2 -1.5 81.0 14.2
Unweighted mean 37.3 21.2 5.4 58.9 35.4
Group 4
Paraguay 1,270 2.5 23.3 25.7 12.1 88.6 11.3
Honduras 580 2.3 22.2 27.0 4.6 93.7 5.9
Papua New Guinea 830 1.9 31.9 34.0 6.2 96.7 3.0
Togo 410 1.6 35.8 25.5 8.1 90.4 9.6
Sierra Leone 210 1.5 42.9 14.2 1.6(c) 63.8 32.3
Nigeria 340 1.4 36.8 37.6 1.3 3.3 1.1
El Salvador 1,080 0.9 26.4 23.1 -1.6 59.0 40.5
Guatemala 930 0.8 27.2 20.7 3.3 70.1 27.9
Côte d'Ivoire 690 0.5 37.8 22.5 3.3 78.8 10.7
Peru 1,070 0.3 12.2 50.1 6.2 75.0 18.1
Bolivia 650 -0.1 n/a n/a 2.0 67.4 4.4
Haiti 370 -0.6 n/a n/a 3.3 58.2 41.8
Nicaragua 460 -2.2 35.5 28.4 -4.6 86.5 12.5
Unweighted mean 30.2 28.1 3.5 71.7 16.9
Note: (a) In latest year for which data are available.
(b) For years other than those shown.
(c) 1976-90.
Sources: GDP growth: World Bank, 1992a.  All others: World Bank, 1992c.
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The value of any analysis based on such figures will be influenced by the relative importance
of the importing state in the exporter's trade.  A check was made to see whether the EU was a
significant market for the countries in the sample.  This is reported in Appendix 3, which
shows for each of the countries the share of the EU in total exports in 1975 and 1991 (or the
closest year for which data are available).  The table also shows the change in the relative
importance of the EU between these two years.  In most cases, the EU is an important market. 
In two of the four sub-groups the unweighted EU share of exports in 1991 is around one-third
and in two it is between one-third and one-half.  There are only a few cases where the EU's
share of total exports is so small as to cast doubt on its value as a basis for analysis.  As
explained above, eight states were excluded from further analysis on this basis (since changes
in the characteristics of exports to the EU market may simply reflect a redirection of trade
rather than a change in total exports).  These eight were all states in which the EU accounted
for less than 20% of exports in both 1975 and 1991.
One interesting feature of Appendix 3 which is not taken any further in this paper is that there
are significant differences between the sample countries in terms of changes in the relative
importance of the EU as a market for their exports, but these are not obviously related to wealth
or growth rate.  In some cases the EU's share has risen significantly, and in others it has fallen
equally substantially.  One, frequently voiced, hypothesis is that a failure to diversify
geographically (i.e. over-concentration on slow growing Europe) is a factor in poor economic
performance.  The table provides little support for this hypothesis.  It is true that the rich, fast
growers have reduced the share of their exports destined for Europe, but so have the poor,
slow growers (with an unweighted average decline of 6%).  It is the two middle categories -
one fast and one slow growing - that have seen, on average, a substantial increase in the share
of exports directed to the EU. 
This complex picture reinforces the desirability of extending the analysis to include market
diversification.  The main obstacle encountered in this so far is that the readily available, PC-
readable import statistics for the USA (which is the obvious choice for the next importing




For all countries in the sample, EU import statistics for 1976 and 1992 were analysed to show
the number of 4-digit product categories that accounted for 80% or so of total exports to the
EU.  The countries were then ranked according to the degree of change in the number of
commodities involved.  This was done both in relation to absolute change in the number of
exports in the top 80% and in relation to proportionate change.  The results are presented in
Table 4, which organises the countries according to their position in the four groups and, within
each of these, in declining order of the change in the number of items exported.  In order to
facilitate comparison, the table provides two measures of the average for each country group -
an unweighted mean and a median.
On both indicators of change, the table tends to show more diversification by the fast growing
groups than by the slow growers.  Both the mean and the median are higher for Group 1 than for 
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Group 2, and the mean is higher for Group 3 than for Group 4.  But there are many
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Table 4
Product diversification and change in unit value
No. of 4-digit Change in no. of Change in
product groups(a) 4-digit product groups average unit
1976 1992 absolute % value (%)
Group 1
Thailand 12 61 49 408.3 208.5
Turkey 16 62 46 287.5 86.0
Malaysia 5 45 40 800.0 158.6
Hong Kong 19 45 26 136.8 108.3
Tunisia 13 28 15 115.4 332.3
Mauritius 1 9 8 800.0 233.7
Botswana 1 5 4 400.0
73.0
Unweighted mean 10 36 27 421.2 171.5
Median(b) 12 45 33 275.0 158.6
Group 2
Brazil 19 50 31 163.2 63.0
Chile 3 14 11 366.7 22.8
Argentina 16 26 10 62.5 29.0
Uruguay 8 17 9 112.5 74.5
Venezuela 2 4 2 100.0 40.8
Costa Rica 2 4 2 100.0 73.3
South Africa 16 17 1 6.3 -22.9
Jamaica 3 4 1 33.3 145.6
Panama 2 3 1 50.0 106.8
Algeria 1 2 1 100.0 55.1
Unweighted mean 7 14 7 109.4 58.8
Median(b) 3 9 6 200.0 59.1
Group 3
India 24 64 40 166.7 76.9
Sri Lanka 5 28 23 460.0 207.0
Morocco 13 35 22 169.2 269.5
Zimbabwe 1 12 11 1100.0 84.3
Pakistan 19 27 8 42.1 78.4
Tanzania 6 12 6 100.0 29.4
Bangladesh 5 11 6 120.0 746.1
Senegal 4 9 5 125.0 102.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 6 3 100.0 36.8
Kenya 9 11 2 22.2 68.8
Colombia 3 5 2 66.7 -88.6
Ghana 4 5 1 25.0 52.9
Burkina Faso 2 3 1 50.0 276.8
Burundi 2 2 0 0.0 0.5
Malawi 2 2 0 0.0 102.2
Uganda 1 1 0 0.0 -32.6
Nepal 4 1 -3 -75.0 2245.2
Unweighted mean 6 14 7 145.4 250.4
Median(b) 4 9 5 125.0 78.4
Group 4
Peru 6 12 6 100.0 126.9
Côte d'Ivoire 5 11 6 120.0 91.3
Haiti 1 7 6 600.0 -4.5
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differences within groups as well as between them, as is illustrated by the fact that the median
percentage product change for Group 4 is higher than for Group 3 even though the mean is
lower (as are both mean and median for absolute product change).  The intra-group variations
are more pronounced among the two poorer groups.  Comparing the two richer groups, for
example, only a couple of states in Group 2 have a higher percentage change in product groups
than any state in Group 1.  In Group 4, by contrast, all states have a higher percentage change
than the worst performer of Group 3, and an identical number in the two groups have a change
of 100% or more.
The relationship between diversification and GDP growth is further elaborated in Figures 8
and 9, which for each country plot annual GDP growth against the absolute change and
percentage change in the number of exported products.  Both scatters suggest that a positive
correlation does exist, i.e. that higher levels of growth are associated with more
diversification.  A correlation coefficient was calculated for each of the two sets of data.  In
neither case did the calculation produce a strong result, but for Figure 8 there is a coefficient of
correlation of 0.42 between GDP growth and the absolute change in the number of product
groups.  (For Figure 9 the coefficient was 0.27.)
Change in export value
A second set of analyses was made to examine changes in the value of each country's exports. 
The average unit value of each state's total exports to the EU in 1976 and 1992 was calculated.
 The results are also presented in Table 4.
With few exceptions, the fast growing countries in each of the two income groups have
Table 4 (continued)
No. of 4-digit Change in no. of Change in
product groups(a) 4-digit product groups average unit
1976 1992 absolute % value (%)
Group 4 (continued)
Guatemala 2 6 4 200.0 -0.3
Togo 2 6 4 200.0 47.6
Honduras 2 5 3 150.0 20.6
Paraguay 5 7 2 40.0 -14.8
Bolivia 2 4 2 100.0 -52.8
Papua New Guinea 2 3 1 50.0 26.2
El Salvador 1 2 1 100.0 -24.7
Nicaragua 2 2 0 0.0 19.5
Nigeria 1 1 0 0.0 32.2
Sierra Leone 5 2 -3 -60.0 554.7
Unweighted mean 3 6 2 123.1 63.2
Median(b) 2 5 3 150.0 20.6
Notes:
(a) Accounting for about 80% of total exports.
(b) The figure for the median in the `Change in number of 4-digit product groups' columns has been
calculated from the medians for the number of 4-digit product groups in 1976 and 1992.
Source: Eurostat, 1991a and 1993.
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experienced a larger increase in export unit value than have their slower growing peers.  The
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Note: The indicator of diversification is absolute change in number of 4-digit product groups comprising
about 80% of total exports.
Note: The indicator of diversification is percentage change in number of 4-digit product groups
comprising about 80% of total exports.
Figure 1
GDP growth against absolute diversification
Figure 2
GDP growth against percentage diversification
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median for Group 1 is almost three times as great as that for Group 2, while in the case of
Groups 3 and 4 the multiple is almost four.  All but two of the states in Group 1, and seven of
the 17 states in Group 3 had rates of increase in excess of 100%; only two of the 13 states in
Group 4, and two of the ten states in Group 2 achieved this.  By contrast, over one-third of the
Group 4 states experienced negative growth; for Group 3, fewer than one-twelfth did so.
As with product diversification, the relationship between GDP growth and changes in export
unit value has been plotted in a scatter diagram (Figure 10).  With the exception of a small
number of outliers, it provides an impression of a positive relationship between the two
variables.  However, the relationship is not a very strong one.  A coefficient of correlation of
0.47 was calculated for the relationship between GDP growth and change in unit value for all
states except the five outliers (Bangladesh, Botswana, Colombia, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone)
and Nepal, which, with a change in average export unit value of 2245%, is excluded from the
figure.  Clearly, other tests and other permutations of characteristics could be tried.
The relationship between diversification and unit value
The two sets of indicators - diversification and unit value change - are plotted
against each other in Figures 11 and 12.  The figures also identify by name outlying
states, i.e. countries that are not in the same part of the figure as most other
members of their group (Nepal has again been excluded from both figures). 
Nothing further is done in this paper to analyse other differences between outliers
and their peers, but the data will serve as a starting point for subsequent work.
Figure 3
GDP growth against change in export unit value
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Note: The indicator of diversification is absolute change in number of 4-digit product groups comprising
about 80% of total exports.
Note: The indicator of diversification is percentage change in number of 4-digit product groups
comprising about 80% of total exports.
Figure 4
Unit value change against absolute diversification
Figure 5
Unit value change against percentage diversification
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Neither figure provides any strong hint of a positive correlation between diversification and
change in unit value.  It did not seem worthwhile to subject the data, as currently presented, to
more formal tests for correlation.  Rather, the figures suggest a need to think further about
possibilities for refining the indicators.
The value of traditional exports
One weakness of such attempts to draw lessons from data on diversification is that they fail to
distinguish between countries with traditional exports that have experienced buoyant markets
and those that have been unfortunate in this respect.  As explained above, not all traditional
primaries have experienced adverse market conditions during the review period.  The
implications to be drawn from a failure to diversify by a state that has rapidly growing export
revenue from its traditionals are quite different from those relating to a state facing a sharp fall
in traditional prices.
An attempt was made to probe further into the relationship between diversification and
increases in the unit value of exports by identifying the extent to which the latter were due to a
growth in the unit value of traditional or of non-traditional exports.  Wherever possible from
the trade statistics, data were collected on the unit value in both 1976 and 1992 of all products
that were exported to the EU in both years.  This was a difficult exercise, involving a certain
degree of judgement, because product categories have changed substantially during this period.
 In some cases products were identified at the 4- and in other cases at the 6-digit level,
according to what seemed to be most appropriate.  Traditional exports were deemed to be
those that were exported in both 1976 and 1992; those items that were exported in 1992 but not
in 1976 were deemed to be non-traditional exports.  The rate of change in unit value of all
traditional exports between 1976 and 1992 was then calculated.
Ideally, the growth of traditional export unit value should be compared directly with the change
in unit value of non-traditional exports.  However, the detailed analysis of every year's
statistics needed to identify the emergence and track the progress of every non-traditional
export was beyond our scope.  A rough and ready short cut is to compare the change for
traditional exports with the change for all exports.  Since the latter is an amalgam of traditional
and non-traditional products it cannot be taken as a direct proxy for one group.  But a
comparison between the experiences of traditional and of all exports may, at the least, suggest
areas for more detailed further work.
In this expectation, for each country in the sample the rate of change in unit value of each
traditional item was compared to the rate of change for total exports.  A record was made of
the number of traditional items with growth in excess of (or decline less than) the mean for all
exports.  The results are summarised in Table 5.  One difference between the groups that seems
to emerge from the table concerns the relative unit value performance of traditionals in fast and
slow growers.  In both fast growing categories there were very few countries in which
traditionals as a group experienced equal or more rapid unit value growth than the average
(and hence, by implication, non-traditionals).  In the two slow growing categories traditionals
tended to perform relatively better.  In Group 2, half of the countries had greater or equal
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If there is any causality in this apparent link its nature is not made clear by these analyses, nor
need it be identical in all cases.  Perhaps the table reflects a qualitative difference between
diversification in fast and slow growers, with the former able to shift not just into any new
product but into ones with superior growth characteristics.  Perhaps it is an echo of the primary
endowment curse: states with relatively strong traditionals (compared with the immediately
available alternatives) find it more difficult to diversify even though the absolute performance
of the traditionals is unsatisfactory.  In either case, country studies are probably the most
sensible way to probe the relationship further.
Another illustration of the fact that there are qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of
diversification has been provided by an attempt to link the data in Table 5 with those in Table 4
on percentage change in major exports and unit values.  The link between the two tables is that
Table 5 emphasises those states with `anomalous' figures on diversification and unit value. 
This is to facilitate observation of any possible explanations from the underlying performance
of traditionals.  The anomalies identified are defined as:
• states that have achieved a higher-than-average (for their group) increase in unit
value despite a lower-than-average diversification; and
• states that have experienced the opposite - lower-than-average unit value growth
despite higher-than-average diversification.
In fact, far from `explaining' the anomaly, the exercise has compounded the problem.  The
hypothesis being examined was that states with a high unit value growth but only low
diversification might have achieved this because they were blessed with buoyant traditionals
(and vice versa for the second anomalous group).  In fact, none of the first anomaly category
had more traditionals with above than with below average growth.  Indeed, most had no
Table 5 (continued)
Above average(a) Below average(a)
Group 4 (continued)
El Salvador 0 1
Togo 0 1
Peru 0 4
Côte d'Ivoire 0 5
Sierra Leone(b)
No. with above average >= below average 3 (out of 12)
Key:
Countries in italics are in anomaly group 1, i.e. higher-than average unit value change/lower-than-average
percentage change in number of product groups.
Countries in bold italics are in anomaly group 2, i.e. lower-than-average unit value change/higher-than-
average percentage change in number of product groups.
Notes:
(a) The term `average' means the rate of change 1976-92 in the mean unit value of total EU imports from
each state.
(b) Excludes diamonds or precious/semi-precious stones, which were exported in both years but for
which it is impossible to establish unit values.
Source: Eurostat, 1991a and 1993.
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traditionals with above average growth.   Similarly, most of the second group also had more
below than above average traditional items.  In other words, although they diversified
relatively strongly, and their new exports performed better than their old ones, they nonetheless
experienced below average unit value growth.  It seems clear that the microscope has to be
trained more closely on specific countries to find out what is going on.
Linking human resources and export diversification
To what extent do success or failure in export diversification appear to be linked to human
resource endowments?  As a first step in answering this question, the indicators of
diversification and human resources used above have been plotted against each other in scatter
diagrams.  The results are presented in Figures 13-16.
Figures 13 and 14 both plot absolute change in number of export groups as the indicator of
diversification against, respectively, as the indicator of human resources, mean years of
schooling and the log of school years per square kilometre.  Figures 15 and 16 substitute as the
measure of diversification the change in export unit value, and retain the two alternative
measures of human resources.
None of the figures suggests a strong correlation between the indicators plotted, an impression
that has been confirmed by the calculation of simple correlation coefficients for each of the
four pairs of variables.  These revealed very weak positive correlations for Figures 13, 14 and
16, and a very weak negative correlation for Figure 15.  (None was statistically significant at
conventional confidence levels.)
These findings may appear at first sight to be at variance with recent UNCTAD calculations
that have found a quite strong correlation between export diversification and a human resource
indicator [United Nations, 1994].  In this case, the selected diversification indicator was the
share in total exports of the top three commodities, while the human resource indicator was the
secondary school enrolment rate.
The difference in findings may be due in part to the different indicators employed, but another
factor to be borne in mind is that the two exercises are attempting to measure two subtly
different relationships.  The UNCTAD exercise is concerned with the absolute level of
diversification (and human capital), ours with change in the level of diversification.  A
relatively strong correlation between the absolute level of diversification and of education is
intuitively plausible: the share of manufactures in total exports is higher in countries with more
education, and it is less common for predominantly manufactures exporters to have exports
concentrated on a small number of products than is the case for primary exporters.
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Figure 6
Export diversification against AVSY
Figure 7
Export diversification against ln(HRNR)
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Figure 8
Export diversification against AVSY
Figure 9
Export diversification against ln(HRNR)
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The Next Steps
There are no conclusions as such to this Working Paper; it is not that sort of paper.  Instead, this
final section attempts to draw the main threads of the paper together in such a way as to focus
attention on areas in which further research appears to be particularly worthwhile.
The human resource-natural resource balance hypothesis
The paper has presented substantial evidence for the positive effect of human resources on
growth.  An obvious next step is to explore the determinants of human resource accumulation. 
The paper has found some support for the hypothesis that relative resource endowments
influence the accumulation of human resources. 
The findings identify three central questions:
• To what extent do relative resource endowments influence skill accumulation?
• What other factors influence skill accumulation?
• Why is skill accumulation so central to growth?
The first of these is narrow and relates directly to the `human resource-natural resource
balance' hypothesis.  The latter two are broad, but the findings in this paper underscores their
importance in defining development strategies.
Further examination of how relative resource endowments influence skill accumulation
• Is the relationship between growth and endowment ratios evident from the
comparisons among all regions, not just the poorest?  The growth regression
showed that the ratio of human to natural resources has a positive effect on growth.
It would be interesting to examine whether this relationship exists between and
within regions.
• Have relative endowments of human and natural resources diverged over time? 
Our regressions show only weak evidence of this, however the method of
measuring divergence could be improved.  Immediate possibilities include a)
plotting endowment ratios relative to the world average and b) calculating a
transition probability matrix.
• Is the relationship between relative endowments and human resource accumulation
linear or does it take some other form?  Have large amounts of human resources,
e.g. oil, enabled countries to invest heavily in education?  Does the `natural
resource curse' therefore operate only on countries with low human resources and
moderate natural resources?
• Do individual country experiences fit our model?  It would be interesting to
examine the experience of countries in more detail, including pair-wise
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comparisons of countries which conform to and deviate from the model.
Exploration of other factors that influence skill accumulation
• How important are policies and cultural factors in determining human resource
accumulation?  It might be helpful to include policy variables such as dummies for
Universal Primary Education drives, and education expenditure as a percentage of
GDP. Do religious conventions impinge upon skill accumulation - particularly in
relation to female education? 
• Again, it would be useful to look at individual country experiences of human
resource accumulation and to compare experiences from selected countries.
Measuring human resources by years of schooling is not ideal.  The different components of a
country's true human resources are reflected in different variables (some measurable, some
not).  This is a source of concern if years of schooling is a biased measure, e.g. if it captures
more of the true human resource endowment in certain countries than in others.  The bias could
exist in comparisons between countries at different levels of development and between
countries with cultural differences.  The examination of alternative ways in which to measure
different types of human resources would be desirable.
Why are human resources so important to growth?
This is the focus of some of the work on new growth theory. In the present context it may be
interesting to look at individual country experiences. One question is whether human resource
accumulation is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for growth. Sri Lanka's experience
suggests it is not a sufficient condition. Are there any countries which suggest it is not a
necessary condition?  What other factors must accompany human resources in order to achieve
growth?
The export diversification hypothesis
The hypothesis arose out of research concerned with identifying practical indicators of
diversification that can be applied to a large number of countries and appear to produce
interesting results.  Not very much has yet been done to build upon this exercise.  The intention
is to apply the methodology initially to discover whether:
• failure to diversify is a characteristic of many or most of the poorest countries that
are failing to grow;
• and whether there is any evidence of correlation with other common characteristics
of this group.
A second-round set of issues to be explored once these questions have been answered
persuasively would include the identification of common causes for the failure to diversify and
an appropriate set of prescriptions. 
But before these issues can be addressed in a serious way, some shortcomings arising from the
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genesis of the project need to be addressed.  The three most important are:
• to establish more rigorously the assumptions underlying the hypothesis that
diversification has had beneficial effects and to distinguish more precisely between
policy and physical constraints to diversification.
• to refine the indicators and tests;
• and to extend the analysis to include more importing states.
Indicators and tests
The tests that have been undertaken so far can be taken further (e.g. regression analysis). But
are the criteria used the only, or the most important, ones?  Moreover, are the indicators used
the best ones?  Before shooting off a wide range of tests, it is important to think through what it
is that the indicators are supposed to show and identify (perhaps through some early country
studies) whether or not the picture they paint conforms to reality. 
A related point is to consider more carefully the effects on the usefulness of the indicators
arising from the characteristics of the commodities in question.  One example of the types of
problem that must be addressed arises because the trade nomenclatures are not designed
primarily to aid scientific enquiry.  Probably the most important single influence on the EU's
nomenclature is the desire to monitor `sensitive' imports for protectionist purposes.  Hence,
some product groups may be divided into more sub-categories than others.  Does this affect the
validity of the number of 4-digit product groups exported indicator? 
Another example stems from the blunt nature of the average export unit value indicators.  This
has to be established in relation to weight, but this means that a different interpretation may be
justified if a given percentage increase results from diversifying out of feathers into copper
rather than the reverse.
Commodity and country studies
There are many areas in which more detailed commodity-specific data would be helpful. 
Among the most pressing are:
• to distinguish more clearly between traditional and non-traditional items;
• to provide some information on what happened between the two years for which
data has been collected;
• and to establish more clearly in relation to important commodity groups the
evidence on which the hypothesis is based (that diversification has tended to be into
items with better market conditions for the exporter).
A limited number of country case studies would help on at least two fronts.  One is to identify
different country responses to the same set of external stimuli. Some states, for example, have
successfully expanded production of commodities even though other countries have been
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reducing output of the same item at the same time. A comparison between such pairs of states
would provide pointers towards sectoral policy differences between countries.
The second objective is to determine how far the picture presented by the statistical analysis
reflects reality.  It is very easy to be carried away with a view that appears to be justified by
trade statistics but which, on investigation, arises from re-exports, or mis-recording, or simply
a lack of knowledge of the characteristics of the commodities/industries in question.  The best
way to guard against this is to undertake country studies in parallel with the trade statistics
analysis.  The main constraint is that country studies are expensive in terms of money and time.
 A short cut may be to graft onto country studies being undertaken primarily with other
objectives an element of research to inform the export diversification hypothesis work.
Importing states
The analysis should be extended to more importing states.  But the data manipulation problems
of US statistics are serious.  Unless these can be overcome, it would be more cost effective to
undertake a limited analysis based on countries for which the EU is the major OECD market
than to attempt a broad trawl. 
Moreover, even the addition of the USA would not provide a completely adequate picture.  A
reasonable working hypothesis is that some of the most successful market diversification has
been into rapidly growing non-OECD markets.  Perhaps the problem could be dealt with best
by selecting as the target group only those developing countries for which the EU remains the
dominant market.  But this approach would compound the problem of establishing the
benchmarks against which comparisons are made.  Not all states that have diversified their
exports away from the EU will have done so for similar reasons or with similar results.
Combining the different characteristics identified in the paper
Two ideas for further work are:
• to examine the interrelationships between the variables;
• to regress growth on all variables simultaneously.
The characteristics (variables) identified were:
• trade and macro policies;
• level of human resources;
• relative resource endowments;
• export diversification.
Identifying interrelationships among the variables
A first step for further work would be to look at interrelationships among the variables.  The
53
paper made a preliminary attempt at relating a) human resource accumulation to endowment
ratios and b) export diversification to human resource levels and endowment ratios. Both
relationships should be further explored.
Diversification and human resources
The scatter diagrams on pp. 41 and 42 relate changes in trade patterns (diversification) to
levels of human resources. Underlying this is the theory that high levels of human resources
confer economic flexibility.  This is based on the assumptions that educated people can learn
new skills more easily and that they are more able to identify lucrative export opportunities. 
Thus for a given point in time, a high level of human resources will allow for greater
diversification in the subsequent period.  However, we should also relate a) levels of
diversification to levels of human resources and b) changes in trade patterns to changes in
human resources. 
Export unit value (euv) and human resources
There seems to be a relationship between export unit value and human resources (both absolute
and the human/natural resource ratio).  However, the pattern is not very clear.  Refinement of
the variables and methodology may show a closer relationship.  In some ways this exercise is
similar to relating export composition to endowment ratios in Figure 3. The value added
component of euv is related to the ratio of manufactured to primary exports, Xm/Xp.  (Higher
value added is usually associated with higher Xm/Xp.) 
A problem with using euv as a measure of diversification occurs when economies diversify
into completely new product groups.  (Textiles have a higher unit value index than machinery
or electrical equipment, although we know that skill requirements are much higher in machinery
and electronics.)  It may therefore be useful to look at diversification (changes in euv) within
narrower product groups, e.g. textiles, electrical equipment, agricultural products and minerals.
  
It would also be useful to look at individual country experiences with respect to diversification
and human resources.
Regressing growth against all variables
The regression of growth on human resources could be extended to include independent
variables for trade and macro policy and export diversification.  Each section has examined the
relation between a certain variable and growth.  A multiple regression would identify the
impact of each variable while controlling for other influences.  It would also show what
proportion of growth can be explained by the variables identified in this paper.
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Appendix 1
Definition of Variables and Sources
Definitions of variables from Barro [1991]
ASSASS Number of assassinations per million population per year (1960-85).
GDP60 1960 level of real per capita GDP (1980 base year).
GDP85 1985 level of real per capita GDP (1980 base year).
GR6085 Growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1960 to 1985.
HSGVXDXE Share of real government consumption expenditures minus defense and
education expenditures.  This was used for Barro's Gc/Y which was defined
as the average (from 1970 to 1985) of the ratio of real government
consumption (exclusive of defence and education) to real GDP.
PPI60DEV Magnitude of deviation of PPPI60 from the sample mean.
PPPI60 1960 purchasing power parity value for the investment deflator (USA = 1).
PRIM60 1960 primary school enrolment rate.
REVCOUP Number of revolutions and coups per year.
SEC60 1960 secondary school enrolment rate.
Definitions of other variables
AFR Dummy for Africa.
AVSY60 Average years of schooling for the population 25 years and older in 1960.
CHAVSY6085 Absolute change in average years of schooling for the adult population
between 1960 and 1985.
HRNR Human resources (SY)/natural resources (LAND).
LAC Dummy for Latin America.
LAND Thousands of km2 of land area.
LANDAD Km2 per person (adult).
SY Total number of years of schooling attained by the adult population
(AVSY*AD) (in millions).
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Xm/Xp The ratio of manufactured exports (SITC 5 to 8 -68) to primary exports
(SITC 0 to 4 +68).
Data sources
Data on the composition of exports are from the UNCTAD Handbook of Trade and
Development Statistics 1991, Table 4.1.  The data refer to exports in 1989.
The data on human resources (average years of schooling and adult population) are from Barro
and Lee [1993], and (for regional averages) UNDP's Human Development Report 1992.
The data on land are from the World Development Indicators, World Development Report
1992.
For all other variables the data are from what is believed to be Barro's original data-set
(provided on a disk by Ross Levine, with other data).  It was assumed that variables with the
same name as in the Barro [1991] article were the same variables.  Where the name was not
exactly the same, the variable which seemed closest was substituted.  This applies to the use of
REVCOUP instead of REV and HSGVXDXE instead of Gc/Y.  (Both of these performed




Re-working Barro's growth equation
In Table A1 we first replicated Barro's regression (1) [Barro 1993:Table 1, regression 1]
using what we believe to be his original sample of countries and variables.11  The results (2)
were almost exactly the same as his, except for the two variables ASSASS and PPI60DEV,
which were insignificant in our regression.  The aberrant behaviour of these variables
probably accounted for the small differences in the other variables and the fall in R2 from 0.56
to 0.52.
The same regression was run for the sample of 88 countries (those for which AVSY60 was
available), still using Barro's specification (3).  This was to see whether reducing the sample
size would affect the regression results, which it did not. 
It was decided to drop the two variables which were insignificant and compare subsequent
regressions with regression (4) (i.e. Barro's specification, but without ASSASS and
PPI60DEV).  The remaining regressions substitute average years of schooling for enrolment
rates in the Barro regression. 
The effect of substituting average years of schooling for enrolment rates
Regression (5) uses average years of schooling as the human resource variable for the 88-
country sample.  Comparing (5) with (4)12 we find little difference in the regression results. 
All coefficients increase slightly in absolute size (negative coefficients become more negative,
positive more positive).  R2 falls by 0.02 but R-bar-squared is unchanged, so the fit is
essentially the same.  As mentioned in the text, the difference in units causes the coefficient for
AVSY60 to be smaller than those on primary and secondary enrolment rates.  AVSY60 is also
slightly more significant than primary and secondary enrolment rates.  This is probably because
our regression uses one rather than two variables for human resources.  
Effects of reducing the sample size
Reducing the sample size from 88 to 43 countries does not greatly alter the results, but there are
some changes.  Comparing regression (4) with (6) there are notable changes in the significance
levels of several coefficients.  SEC60 and PRIM60 lose all significance, while HSGVXDXE
falls from a 1% significance level to a 5% level.  The coefficient on GDP60 becomes more
negative.  Comparing regression (5) with (7), there are no changes in the sign
                                                                                                                                                       
11 Barro's original data as compiled by Levine and Renelt were used.  It is assumed that we have been
operating with the same (n=98) countries since the elimination of all countries for which data were missing
produces a population of 98 countries (see Appendix 4).
12 Regressions (4) and (5) were also run excluding Taiwan and South Korea.  Their exclusion made no
difference to the regression results.
Table A1
Regressions for per capita growth (GR6085)
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No. obs. 98 98 88 88 88 43 43
Const. 0.0302*** 0.0304*** 0.0340*** 0.0334*** 0.0465*** 0.0326*** 0.0391***
(0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0051) (0.0939) (0.0066)
GDP60 -0.0075*** -0.0074*** -0.0075*** -0.0077*** -0.0086*** -0.0102*** -0.0120***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0025)
SEC60 0.0305*** 0.0328*** 0.0351*** 0.0354*** --- 0.0160 ---
(0.0079) (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.1200) (0.0303)
PRIM60 0.0250*** 0.0224*** 0.0183** 0.0191*** --- 0.0191 ---
0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0120)
HSGVXDXE -0.1190*** -0.1332*** -0.1362*** -0.1332*** -0.1640*** -0.1073** -0.1226***
(0.0280) (0.0290) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0423) (0.0585)
REVCOUP -0.0195*** -0.0236*** -0.0242*** -0.0285*** -0.0314*** -0.0233*** -0.0264***
(0.0063) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0115)
ASSASS -0.0333** -0.0028 -0.0031 --- --- --- ---
(0.0155) (0.0032) (0.0032)
PPI60DEV -0.0143*** -0.0067* -0.0070* --- --- --- ---
(0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0041)
AVSY60 --- --- --- --- 0.0050*** --- 0.0064***
(0.0011) (0.0017)
R-sq. 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.40 0.50
R-bar-sq. 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.32 0.44
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
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or significance of the coefficients, although the sizes of some alter slightly.  The
closeness of fit is much the same.
Replacing enrolment ratios with average years of schooling in the 43-country
sample has much the same effect as in the 88-country sample.  Comparing
regression (6) with regression (7), the absolute size of the coefficients increases,
which is similar to the change in coefficients between regressions (4) and (5).  The
variable HSGVXDXE, reflecting government expenditure, becomes more
significant.  In addition, there is an improvement in fit between (6) and (7),
reflecting the significance of AVSY60 in regression (7) and the insignificance of
SEC60 and PRIM60 in regression (6).
Incorporating endowment ratios
Taking regression (5) as a starting point, Ln(HRNR) was added as an independent
variable (regression (8i) of Table A2(i)).  In regression (9i), a measure of natural
resources alone (log of number of adults per km2) was substituted for the human to
natural resource ratio.  Finally, in regression (10i) no variable for human resources
alone was included, only the logged ratio of human to natural resources.
Table A2(i)
Regression for per capita growth (GR6085)
Regression (5) (8i) (9i) (10i)
No. obs. 88 88 88 88
Const. 0.0465*** 0.0382*** 0.0371*** 0.0358***
(0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0061)
GDP60 -0.0086*** -0.0074*** -0.0076*** -0.0039***
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.977E-5)
HSGVXDXE -0.1640*** -0.1357*** -0.1355*** -0.1143***
(0.0298) (0.0311) (0.0314) (0.0313)
REVCOUP -0.0314*** -0.0287*** -0.0285*** -0.0292***
(0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0071)
AVSY60 0.0050*** 0.0034*** 0.0044*** ---
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011)
LnHRNR --- 0.0022** --- 0.0036***
(0.893E-3) (0.791E-5)
LnLANDAD --- --- -0.0023** ---
(0.958E-3)
R-sq. 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.45
R-bar-sq. 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.42
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
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The coefficient on the log of the human/natural resource ratio is positive and
significant (at the 5% level) (regression 8i).  Excluding average years of schooling
improves the level of significance of the resource ratio (to 1%).  The coefficient of
GDP60 becomes less negative due to the high correlation between AVSY60 and
GDP60, and the closeness of fit falls slightly (regression 10i).  The natural resource
variable on its own (regression 9i) is also significant (at the 5% level).
Barro found dummies for Africa and Latin America to be highly significant in
explaining per capita growth.  We anticipated that including the endowment ratio
and land variable would render these regional dummies insignificant.  However, as
may be seen in Table A2(ii), the dummies remained significant.  There is clearly
some collinearity between our natural resource variable and the regional dummies,
as evidenced by the reduction in the significance levels of LnHRNR in regression
(8ii) and of LnLANDAD in regression (9ii), but the dummies have more
explanatory power (as evidenced by the improvement in the R-bar-squared when
they are included).  This could mean either that our measure of natural resources is
inadequate, or that abundant natural resources are only part of the reason for the
unusually slow growth of these regions.
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Table A2(ii)
Regression for per capita growth (GR6085)
including dummy variables for Africa and Latin America
Regression (5ii) (8ii) (9ii) (10ii)
No. obs. 88 88 88 88
Const. 0.0506*** 0.0441*** 0.0449*** 0.0426***
(0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0059)
GDP60 -0.0083*** -0.0074*** -0.0078*** -0.0044***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.921E-3)
HSGVXDXE -0.1276*** -0.1107*** -0.1151*** -0.0897***
(0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0296)
REVCOUP -0.0264*** -0.0247*** 0.0252*** -0.0251***
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0067)
AVSY60 0.0041*** 0.0030*** 0.0038*** ---
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010)
LnHRNR --- 0.0016* --- 0.0027***
(0.843E-3) (0.766E-3)
LnLANDAD --- --- -0.0013 ---
(0.929E-3)
AFR -0.0143*** -0.0127*** -0.0129*** -0.0140***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0043)
LAC -0.0127*** -0.0120*** -0.0116*** -0.0124***
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
R-sq. 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.54
R-bar-sq. 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.51
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
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Explaining the change in average years of schooling
In Table A3 the simplest regression (11) tests the impact of HRNR (initial years of
schooling per km2) on the absolute change in mean years of schooling between 1960
and 1989.  With HRNR in natural units the relationship is not significant, but when
the log of HRNR is used, its coefficient becomes significant at the 10% level,
although the fit remains poor.
Regression (12) also includes GDP60 and AVSY60 as independent variables.  The
coefficients on GDP60 and LNHRNR are both positive and significant at the 10%
level, while that on AVSY60 is negative and insignificant.  The fit is again poor. 
Running this regression for a 68-country sample, which excludes developed
countries, renders all the coefficients insignificant, and the sign on AVSY60 changes
from negative to positive.
The next step was to consider the impact of the composition of trade on changes in
average years of schooling.  For the 88-country sample, data on the ratio of
manufactured to primary exports (XmXp) was available in 1960 for only 80
countries, and in 1989 for 85 countries (see Appendix 4).  Taking the 80-country
sample, and averaging the opening and closing trade ratios, Ln((XmXp1960 +
XmXp1989)/2), regression (14) yields an insignificant positive coefficient on the
trade ratio.  For the 85-country sample, using the 1989 LnXmXp, the coefficient on
the trade ratio was positive and significant at the 10% level.  (In both these
regressions, the coefficient on GDP60 was positive and significant, and that on
AVSY60 negative and insignificant, as in the resource ratio regressions.)
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Table A3
Explaining the change in average years of schooling (CHG)
Regression (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
No. obs. 88 88 68 80 85
Const. 1.6198*** 1.5684*** 1.8194*** 1.8790*** 1.8637***
(0.1670) (0.1716) (0.3875) (0.1876) (0.1703)
GDP60 --- 0.1730* 0.0838 0.1580* 0.1636*
(0.0881) (0.1249) (0.0922) (0.0876)
AVSY60 --- -0.0954 0.0383 -0.0707 -0.0763
(0.0721) (0.0963) (0.0714) (0.0670)
LnHRNR 0.0808* 0.0876* 0.0400 --- ---
(0.0411) (0.0809) (0.0497)
LnXmXp --- --- --- 0.0621 ---
(avg60-89) (0.0514)
LnXmXp --- --- --- --- 0.0932*
(1989) (0.0504)
R-sq. 0.043 0.087 0.063 0.071 0.094
R-bar-sq. 0.032 0.054 0.020 0.034 0.061
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
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Appendix 3
Proportion of Exports to the EU in 1975 and 1991
(47-country sample)
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1975 1991 Change Change
(%) (%) (absolute, % points) (%)
Group 1
Tunisia 47.8 76.8 29.0 60.7
Mauritius 86.8 70.3 -16.5 -19.0
Turkey 43.9 54.4 10.5 23.9
Thailand 16.2 20.7 4.5 27.8
Hong Kong 24.6 17.6 -7.0 -28.5
Malaysia 23.2 14.8 -8.4 -36.2
Botswana n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unweighted mean 40.4 42.4 2.0
4.8
Group 2
Algeria 55.1 71.3 16.2
29.4
South Africa 39.6 51.3 11.7
29.5
Chile 40.6 32.9 -7.7
-19.0
Venezuela 9.4 32.1 22.7
241.5
Argentina 28.9 31.8 2.9
10.0
Brazil 27.8 31.2 3.4
12.2
Jamaica 23.8 30.0 6.2
26.1
Costa Rica 19.8 29.7 9.9
50.0
Panama 13.9 26.9 13.0
93.5
Uruguay 33.9 24.7 -9.2
-27.1
Unweighted mean 29.3 36.2 6.9
44.6
Group 3
Uganda 37.8 75.9(a) 38.1
100.8
Burundi 41.4 70.4 29.0
70.0
Morocco 54.1 62.4 8.3
15.3
Senegal 63.4 60.6 -2.8
-4.4
Ghana 41.2 60.2 19.0
46.1
Nepal 22.4 55.3 32.9
146.9
Kenya 35.8 44.5 8.7
24.3
Malawi 62.0 43.3 -18.7
-30.2
Zimbabwe 30.6(b) 41.0(a) 10.4
34.0
Burkina Faso 38.3 39.9 1.6
4.2
Egypt, Arab Rep. 11.8 38.2(a) 26.4
223.7
Bangladesh 17.3 32.8 15.5
89.6
Pakistan 18.6 30.6 12.0
64.5
India 20.2 27.5 7.3
36.1




1975 1991 Change Change
(%) (%) (absolute, % points) (%)
Group 4 (continued)
Papua New Guinea 39.5 27.6(a) -11.9 -30.1
Bolivia 17.7 26.5 8.8 49.7
Peru 20.4 24.7 4.3 21.1
Honduras 19.3 24.2 4.9 25.4
El Salvador 24.3 23.6 -0.7 -2.9
Haiti 20.5 14.2 -6.3 -30.7
Guatemala 30.6 11.1 -19.5 -63.7









Different samples of countries were used for the various analyses reported in the Working
Paper.  The differences relate to the objectives of each exercise and the availability of data, as
explained in the text.  For ease of reference, each sample has been given a name that simply
relates to the number of countries in the group.  This Appendix provides the full membership of
each of the samples referred to in the text.
Countries
Sample size
98 88 85 80 69 68 47 43 39 27 12
Algeria _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Argentina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Australia _ _ _ _
Austria _ _ _ _
Bangladesh _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Barbados _ _ _ _ _
Belgium _ _ _ _
Bolivia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Botswana _ _ _ _ _ _
Brazil _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Burkina Faso _ _
Burundi _ _ _
Burma _ _ _ _
Cameroon _
Canada _ _ _ _
Central African Republic _
Chile _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Colombia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Costa Rica _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Côte d'Ivoire _ _ _ _
Cyprus _ _ _ _ _
Denmark _ _ _ _
Dominican Republic _ _ _ _ _ _
Egypt, Arab Republic _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
El Salvador _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _




98 88 85 80 69 68 47 43 39 27 12
Ethiopia _
Fiji _ _ _ _ _
Finland _ _ _ _
France _ _ _ _
Gabon _
Germany _ _ _ _
Ghana _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Great Britain _ _ _ _
Greece _ _ _ _ _
Guatemala _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Guyana _ _ _ _ _
Haiti _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Honduras _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Hong Kong _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Iceland _ _ _ _
India _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Indonesia _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Iraq _ _ _ _ _ _
Ireland _ _ _ _
Israel _ _ _ _ _ _
Italy _ _ _ _
Jamaica _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Japan _ _ _ _
Jordan _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Kenya _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Korea, Republic _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Liberia _ _ _ _ _ _
Luxembourg _
Madagascar _
Malawi _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Malaysia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Malta _ _ _ _ _ _
Mauritius _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _




98 88 85 80 69 68 47 43 39 27 12
Morocco _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Nepal _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Netherlands _ _ _ _
New Zealand _ _ _ _
Nicaragua _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Nigeria _ _ _
Norway _ _ _ _
Pakistan _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Panama _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Papua New Guinea _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Paraguay _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Peru _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Philippines _ _ _ _ _ _
Portugal _ _ _ _ _
Rwanda _
Senegal _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sierra Leone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Singapore _ _ _ _ _ _
South Africa _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Spain _ _ _ _
Sri Lanka _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sudan _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Swaziland _ _ _ _
Sweden _ _ _ _
Switzerland _ _ _ _
Taiwan _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Tanzania _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Thailand _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Togo _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Trinidad and Tobago _ _ _ _ _ _
Tunisia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Turkey _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Uganda _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _




98 88 85 80 69 68 47 43 39 27 12
Uruguay _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Venezuela _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Zaïre _ _ _ _ _ _
Zambia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Zimbabwe _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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